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Sass can't believe the state's argument (photo by John Storz) |
The question seems paradoxical, if not outright nonsensical. And the answer to the question can be equally
goofy—enough to flummox even the sharpest legal watchdog. Take for example, the
Miranda
warnings. The police must read them before
they interrogate an in-custody suspect.
Certainly a person in jail is in custody, right? Not necessarily. The police might be able to legally
interrogate an imprisoned defendant without
Miranda warnings unless the
defendant can later show that he was “
in custody within custody.” (Very clever.) In other words, he was in custody, sure, but
he was out of custody regarding the subject matter of the interrogation! Therefore,
Miranda warnings might not
be required!
Prosecutors and courts like to pay this game with bond
conditions, too. Assume that a
defendant’s signature bond has a “no contact with Ms. Smith” condition, he
signs the bond, but he remains in custody because he’s also being held on another
case for which he can’t post the cash bail.
In this scenario, if he calls Ms. Smith from inside the jail, he’s
committing bail jumping because, even though he’s locked away and literally
can’t get out, he’s technically “released from custody” on the case for which
he signed the signature bond that includes the “no contact with Ms. Smith”
condition! See
State v. Dewitt,
2008 WI App 134. Most prosecutors and some
judges live for this kind of sneaky, form-over-substance, somewhat clever,
“gotcha” approach to criminal law.
But recently, in State v. Jacobs, prosecutors tried
to extend the application of this ploy and went a bit too far. Sure, the trial court judge, Katherine Sloma,
proved to be an eager coconspirator, and bought the prosecutor’s argument hook,
line, and sinker. But the appellate court
couldn’t quite stomach it and had to reverse.